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INTRODUCTION

It has been over 54 years since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The major movement for a civil rights bill began in 1963 when President
Kennedy went to Congress twice with "urgent appeals regarding civil rights."'
Regarding employment discrimination, President Kennedy appealed to the
"democratic principle that no man should be denied employment
commensurate with his abilities because of his race or creed or ancestry." 2
However, in both of President Kennedy's appeals to Congress, he never
mentioned "discrimination because of sex." 3 Congress debated the bill for a
total of 534 hours and made 500 amendments-at the time making it the
longest debate in the Senate's almost 180-year history.4
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in
employment "because of. . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 5
Section 703 of Title VII does not expressly reference sexual orientation or
gender. In fact, "'sex' was added only two days before the bill's passage in
the House, without prior hearing or debate, by an amendment offered by
Representative Howard Smith, who opposed the civil rights bill but believed
his amendment' [would] do some good for the minority sex. '6 Advocates of
the Act as a whole "simply wanted a law to strengthen the government's

/

1.
Eric S. Dreiband & Brett Swearingen, The Evolution of Title VII Sexual Orientation,
Gender Identity, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, JONES DAY 1, 1 (2015),
https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/07f7db 13-4b8c-44c3-a89b-6dcfe4a9e2a
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/74all6bc-2cfe-42d2-92a5-787b40ee0567/dreiband_1gbt.
authcheckdam.pdf.
2.
President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights,
AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(Feb.
28,
1963),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/237036.
3.
Dreiband & Swearingen, supra note 1.
4.
1964, U.S.
EQUAL
EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N,
https://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html (last visited May 9, 2019).
5.
Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of]964, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm (last visited May 9, 2019).
6.
Dreiband & Swearingen, supra note 1.
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meager efforts to protect the rights of freed slaves after the Civil War";7
however, since then it has evolved into so much more.
Section 703 of Title VII has potential to evolve and expand coverage even
further. This Note will predict how the Fourth Circuit would rule on a case
involving sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace under the
"because of . .. sex" language in the statute. For background, this Note will
first cover the evolution and expansion of coverage of Section 703 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act since it went into effect in 1964. Part II will review
the establishment of protections under Title VII of "sex-plus" discrimination;
sexual harassment which creates a hostile or abusive work environment; and
gender or sexual stereotype discrimination. The Part III will review and
analyze the circuit court split on recognition or exclusion of a claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII. The analysis and methodology of the Second
and Seventh Circuits which recognize sexual orientation discrimination as a
claim will be discussed, as well as that of the Eleventh Circuit, which
declined to recognize sexual orientation as a claim under Title VII. Part IV
will provide opposing opinions in amicus curiae briefs from the United States
Department of Justice which opined that the Eleventh Circuit should not
recognize sexual orientation discrimination claims-and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which stated such claims should be
recognized. Part V will analyze the ideology of the Fourth Circuit and
compare this information to the decisions and ideology of the Second,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit to make a conclusion on how the Fourth Circuit
would rule on a case involving sexual orientation discrimination in the
workplace. Next, this Part will analyze data collected from a survey of 655
Title VII cases that the Fourth Circuit heard from January 1, 2008 through
December 31, 2018. The data will be used to predict how the Fourth Circuit
would rule on a sexual orientation discrimination claim under Title VII based
on how the court ruled on Title VII cases over the past ten years. Lastly, this
Part will review previous Fourth Circuit cases that discussed sexual
orientation discrimination as a claim under Title VII.
The purpose of this Note is not to provide an opinion on where the Fourth
Circuit should come out on the issue. Rather, the goal is to provide an
interesting glimpse into the current political ideology of the judges and to
provide an idea of where the Fourth Circuit might fall on the issue based on
an analysis of their past decisions and the current circuit split.

7.
Juan Williams, The 1964 Civil Rights Act: Then andNow, HUMAN RIGHTS (June 30,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/humanrights magazinehome/
human rightsvol3 1_2004/summer2004/irrhr summer041 964cra2.
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II. THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF COVERAGE OF SECTION 703 OF
TITLE VII IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1964

Today, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on sex in violation
of Title VII must show that he or she was discriminated against with "respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," and that
the employer discriminated "because of . .. sex."' Over the years, courts have
expanded what it means to be discriminated against "because of. . . sex," and
it no longer bears the simplistic meaning of discrimination based on having
male or female anatomy. The Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.9 stated that, "[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed."'o Evolving interpretations of Title VII by judges
have added coverage for "sex-plus" discrimination, hostile work
environment which includes sexual harassment claims-and gender or
sexual stereotype discrimination.
"The doctrine of 'sex-plus' discrimination eliminates the loophole in Title
VII that allows employers to selectively hire members of a minority group.""
The sex-plus discrimination theory is supported by Title VII; however, it is
never explicitly mentioned or referenced. 12 The doctrine was first established
in 1971 in the Phillips v. Martin Mariettal3 case, and it occurs in primarily
two situations:
(1) when an employer discriminates against employees on the basis
of an immutable characteristic, such as race, age, and national origin;
or (2) when an employer has one hiring policy for men and another
for women, and the policy distinction is based on some fundamental
right (e.g., the right to marry or the right to have children). 14

8.
9.
10.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at 79 (finding that "because of... sex" covered same-sex harassment claims).

11.

Wendi Barish, Comment, "Sex-Plus" Discrimination: A Discussion of Fisher v.

Vassar

College,

13

HOFSTRA

LAB.

&

EMP.

L.J.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
12. Barish, supra note 11, at 242.

13.

239,

240

(1995),

1 220&context=hlelj.

See generally 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that an employer may not deny

employment to women with pre-school aged children without denying employment to men with
pre-school aged children).

14. Barish, supra note 11 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1091 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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The Phillipsv. Martin Mariettacase served as an illustrative example for
the second situation, as the Court held that an employer may not deny
employment to women with pre-school aged children without also denying
employment to men with pre-school aged children.' 5
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinsonl 6
established that sexual harassment which creates a hostile or abusive work
environment is a violation of Title VII.'1 Prior to 1986, courts had applied the
concept of protection from harassment which created a hostile or abusive
work environment to harassment based on race,'s religion,1 9 and national
origin.20 The Supreme Court explained that "[n]othing in Title VII suggests
that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should
not be likewise prohibited." 2' However, the Supreme Court noted that not all
harassment constitutes a Title VII violation and issued some guidelines for
what behavior falls under Title VII prohibition.22 The Court stated that the
harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of ... employment and create an abusive working environment."'23
In Meritor Savings Bank, a female bank employee brought a sexual
harassment suit against her employer and her supervisor.24 The allegations
included the fact that her boss had conditioned her employment on sexual
favors and that her boss had been making sexual demands of her for years. 25
Vinson also claimed that her boss had raped her several times over the time
of her employment. 26 The Supreme Court found that these claims were
actionable under Title VII and rose to the level of sufficiently severe or
pervasive. 27 This is the holding that established sexual harassment which
creates a hostile or abusive work environment is a violation of Title VII.
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. HopkinS28 added
protection for employees discriminated against according to their gender or

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
(D.C. Cir.
57.
26.
27.
28.

400 U.S. at 544.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
See Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp 157 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977).
Meritor, 477 S.C. at 66.
Id. at 67.
Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 57.
Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 37,38 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753 F.2d 141
1985), reh'g en bane denied, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meritor, 477 U.S.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 74.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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sexual stereotype. 29 The Court held that a suit alleging harassment or disparate
treatment based upon nonconformity with sexual stereotypes-or failure to
conform to gender norms-is cognizable under Title VII as discrimination
because of sex.30 In 1982, Ann Hopkins was working as a senior manager in
an office of Price Waterhouse when she was recommended for partnership. 3
Instead of receiving an offer to join the partnership, Price Waterhouse held
her candidacy for reconsideration for the next year; and when the partners in
her office refused to propose her for partnership again, Hopkins sued Price
Waterhouse under Title VII alleging that "the firm had discriminated against
her on the basis of sex in its decisions regarding partnership." 3 2 The most
profound proof of discrimination came from statements of the Policy Board
at Price Waterhouse, which explained why Hopkins's partnership decision
was placed on hold and advised Hopkins to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry." 33 Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, held that this was
impermissible sex discrimination, and that "[i]n the specific context of sex
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender." 34
III. OPINIONS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS: IS SEXUAL ORIENTATION COVERED
UNDER TITLE VII?

In spite of these major expansions over the years, the Supreme Court has
yet to determine whether sexual orientation is covered under Title VII, and
few circuit courts have attempted to address the issue. "Sexual orientation" is
defined as "[a] person's predisposition or inclination toward sexual activity or
behavior with other males or females," and is commonly categorized as
"heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality." 3 5

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 237.
Id at 250.
Id at 231.
Id. at 231-32.
Id at 235.
Id at 250.
Sexual Orientation,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Recognizing Sexual Orientation Under Title VII: Analysis and
Methodology of the Second and Seventh Circuits

The Second and Seventh Circuits have both recognized sexual orientation
discrimination as a claim under § 703 of Title VII. However, the Second
Circuit had to overrule two cases to arrive at that conclusion. This section of
the Note will discuss the two Second Circuit cases that were overruled and the
case that overruled them. It will also discuss the Seventh Circuit case that held
sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited under Title VII. Since each
case in the Second and Seventh Circuit asked whether an employee's sex is
necessarily a motivating factor in discrimination based on sexual orientation,
the last paragraphs will delve deeper into the analysis and methodology used
in the most recent Second Circuit case and the Seventh Circuit case by
comparing and contrasting their opinions that lead to the same conclusion.
Before 2018, the Second Circuit did not recognize discrimination based
on sexual orientation as a claim under Title VII. The court first expressed this
opinion in 2000 through in Simonton v. Runyon.36 The case was brought by
Dwayne Simonton against the Postmaster General and the United States
Postal Service under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for abuse and
harassment he suffered due to his sexual orientation. 37 Simonton was
employed as a postal worker in New York for approximately twelve years and
"repeatedly received satisfactory to excellent performance evaluations. "38
However, he was "subjected to an abusive and hostile work environment by
reason of his sexual orientation." 39 The facts of this case that discuss the
incidents of Simonton's abuse are particularly outrageous and appalling. The
alleged harassment included repeated verbal assaults from his co-workers,
"notes placed on the wall of the bathroom with Simonton's name and the
names of celebrities who had died of AIDS," and pornographic or explicit and
inappropriate materials taped to his work area, placed in his car, or sent to his
home. 40 While the court noted that the "conduct allegedly engaged in by
Simonton's co-workers was morally reprehensible," the court went on to state,
"we are called upon here to construe a statute as glossed by the Supreme
Court, not to make a moral judgment. "41

36.
Express,
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude
Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id at 35.
Id. (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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The Second Circuit found that Simonton had "no cause of action under
Title VII because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination
because of sexual orientation." 42 The court first noted that it had "little
legislative history to guide them in interpreting the Act's prohibition against
discrimination based on 'sex."' 43 However, it looked to the fact that
"Congress has rejected a number of proposed amendments" based on sexual
orientation as "strong evidence of congressional intent in the face of consistent
judicial decisions refusing to interpret 'sex' to include sexual orientation." 4 4
The Second Circuit primarily supported its decision based on precedent from
its own circuit and the Supreme Court. In DeCintio v. Westchester County
Medical Center, the Second Circuit held that the term "sex," when read in the
context of the other categories afforded protection under Title VII, refers only
"to membership in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual activity
regardless of gender."4 5 When the court analyzed the Supreme Court's
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., the Second Circuit
refused to interpret the case to mean that male harassment of other males
always violates Title VII. 46 Instead, the Second Circuit stated that Oncale
underscored that every victim of sexual harassment, whether the defendant
and plaintiff are of the same or opposite sexes, "must demonstrate that he was
harassed because he was male." 4 7 Based on its analysis, the Second Circuit
concluded that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 48

The second case that demonstrates that the Second Circuit did not
recognize discrimination based on sexual orientation as a claim under Title
VII before 2018 is the Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble 49 case of 2005. In that
case, the plaintiff, Dawn Dawson, who was a "self-described 'lesbian female,
who does not conform to gender norms. . .' claim[ed] that she suffered
discrimination on the basis of sex, sex stereotyping, and/or sexual orientation
in violation of' Title VII.5 o This analysis will focus on any claims dealing
with discrimination based on sexual orientation. The court stated very clearly
that "to the extent that [the plaintiff] is alleging discrimination based upon her

42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
44. Id at 35.
45. Id. at 36 (quoting DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir.
1986)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
48. Id at 35.
49. Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled by Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
50. Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
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lesbianism, Dawson cannot satisfy the first element of a prima facie case
under Title VII because the statute does not recognize homosexuals as a
protected class."
Since discrimination based upon sexual orientation is not actionable
under Title VII, the plaintiff "avail[ed] herself of the 'gender stereotyping'
theory of Title VII liability according to which individuals who fail or refuse
to comply with socially accepted gender roles are members of a protected
class." 52 The issue with this theory when used by homosexual plaintiffs is that
"[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often
necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality." 53 The
court specifically noted that a "gender stereotyping claim should not be used
to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII." 54 One can fail to

conform to gender stereotypes either through behavior or through
appearance.5 5 The plaintiff, Dawson, made "no assertion with respect to
behavioral non-conformance." 56 The court made a comparison to the Price
Waterhouse case in stating that Dawson "was not told by anyone at Bumble
& Bumble that her continued employment depended upon her acting and
speaking in a more 'feminine' manner. "' Further, Dawson's claim with
respect to gender stereotyping based on appearance failed because the record
was "devoid of any substantial evidence that [she] was subjected to any
adverse employment consequences as a result of her appearance."58
In 2018, the Second Circuit overruled Simonton and Dawson when the
court in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.59 held that the plaintiff was entitled to
bring a Title VII claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation.60 Zarda,
a gay former employee, "brought a sex discrimination claim under [Title VII]
alleging that he was fired from his job at Altitude Express, Inc., because he
failed to conform to male sex stereotypes by referring to his sexual
orientation." 61 Zarda worked as a skydiving instructor and regularly
participated in tandem skydives. 62 Zarda's co-workers frequently referenced
his sexual orientation or made sexual jokes around clients, and even Zarda

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id at 218.
Id.
Id. (quoting Howell v. North Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)).
Id. (citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id.
883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL 1756678 (Apr. 22, 2019).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 105-07.
Id. at 108.
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sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to resolve any
uncomfortable feelings "they might have about being strapped to a man for a
tandem skydive." 63 In June 2010, Zarda was preparing for a tandem skydive
when he told his female client that "he was gay and ha[d] an ex-husband to
prove it." 64 However, "the [female] client alleged that Zarda inappropriately

touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior." 65
After the jump was completed, the female client's boyfriend told Zarda's boss
about the alleged inappropriate behavior and disclosure of his sexual
orientation. 66 Even though Zarda denied inappropriately touching his client,
his boss fired him, and he claimed his termination was prompted solely for his
reference to his sexual orientation.67
Prior to bringing the lawsuit in federal court, Zarda filed a discrimination
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and "claimed
that '[a]ll of the men at [his workplace] made light of the intimate nature of
being strapped to a member of the opposite sex,' but that he was fired because
he 'honestly referred to [his] sexual orientation and did not conform to the
straight male macho stereotype." 68

'

The Second Circuit, hearing the case en banc, found that Zarda was
entitled to bring a Title VII claim for discrimination based on sexual
orientation because "sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in
part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination" for purposes of Title
VII. 69 The court first supported this conclusion through their analysis on
"sexual orientation as a function of sex," which included a discussion on the
nature of-and definition of-sexual orientation and its relation to sex.70 The
court concluded that sexual orientation is a function of sex because "one
cannot fully define a person's sexual orientation without identifying his or her
sex." 7
Next, the Second Circuit used an approach called the "comparative test,"
which is a test used by the Supreme Court for "determining whether an
employment practice constitutes sex discrimination." 72 The test determines
"whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner which butfor

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 109.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Idat 116.
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that person's sex would be different." 73 The court concluded that "but for"
Zarda's sex being male his treatment would've been different because a
female who is attracted to males would not have been discriminated against. 74
The Second Circuit made a gender stereotyping analysis as its next
argument in support of concluding that sexual orientation discrimination is a
subset of sex discrimination. The court argued that gender stereotyping is
deeply rooted in sexual orientation discrimination because "same-sex
orientation 'represents the ultimate case of failure to conform' to gender
stereotypes." 75

Lastly, the court applied the concept of associational discrimination to
sexual orientation to support that it is a subset of sex discrimination. The court
explained that in most contexts where an employer discriminates based on
sexual orientation, the employer's decision is primarily based on a negative
opinion about the concept of a physical and romantic relationship between
same sex individuals.76 Therefore, "when an employer fires a gay man based
on the belief that men should not be attracted to other men, the employer
discriminates based on the employee's own sex." 7 7 The court concluded that
these perspectives were sufficient to support the court's holding and
demonstrate that sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination. 7 1
Similar to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, en banc, also
concluded that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of
sex discrimination, and therefore, such discrimination is prohibited by Title
VII. 79 In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, Kimberly Hively brought an

action against Ivy Tech Community College ("Ivy Tech") alleging she was
denied full-time employment and promotions based on sexual orientation in
violation of Title VII.so Hively was an openly lesbian woman who began
teaching as a part time, adjunct professor at Ivy Tech in 2000.1 Between 2009
and 2014, Hively applied for at least six full-time positions and each time she
was unsuccessful.82 On December 13, 2013, Hively filed a charge with the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. 83 Approximately seven months

73. Id. at 117 (citing City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
711 (1978)).
74. Id. at 118.
75. Id. at 121 (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339,339(7th Cir. 2017)).
76. Id. at 124.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 132.
79. Hively, 853 F.3d at 351-52.
80. Id. at 341.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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later, her part-time contract was not renewed. 84 After receiving her right-tosue letter, she filed an action with the district court and appealed it up to the
Seventh Circuit. 85
The Seventh Circuit held that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation constitutes sex discrimination for two major reasons. First, the
court analyzed the case using the "comparative method," where the test asks:
whether holding all other things constant and changing only her sex, would
she have been treated the same way? 8 6 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
because a man in Hively's position would not have faced discrimination, any
discrimination Hively faced constituted "paradigmatic sex discrimination."17
The Seventh Circuit also supported this conclusion with a gender stereotype
analysis. The analysis characterized the Court's "gender non-conformity line
of cases" as having established a form of discrimination based on sex
stereotypes and Hively's failure to adhere to heterosexual norms was the
"ultimate case of failure to conform to the female stereotype.""
Secondly, the court used the associational theory to support its
conclusion.89 The associational theory states that, "a person who is
discriminated against because of the protected characteristic of one with
whom she associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her own
traits." 90 The court held that this also applies to discrimination on the basis of
a person's partner's sex which amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex. 9
The Seventh and Second Circuit used a majority of the same methods of
analysis and theories to come to the same conclusion. Both courts utilized the
comparative test, the associational discrimination theory, and definitional
analysis to determine that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a
subset of sex discrimination and is therefore covered under Title VII.92
The Zarda court stated that its conclusion that Zarda was entitled to bring
a Title VII claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation is supported

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 345.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 346; see Statutory Interpretation-Title VII Seventh CircuitHolds Sexual
OrientationDiscrimination is a Form of Sex Discrimination-Hivelyv. Ivy Tech Community
College, 853 F.3d339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc), 131 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1491 (2018) (quoting
Hively, 853 F.3d at 346).
89. Hively, 853 F.3d at 347.
90. Id. at 347.
91. Id. at 349.
92. See id. at 345, 348; Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113, 116 (2d Cir.
2018).
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by the comparative test. 93 The comparative test is the "Supreme Court's test
for determining whether an employment practice constitutes sex
discrimination." 9 4 The test determines "whether the trait that is the basis for
discrimination is a function of sex by asking whether an employee's treatment
would have been different 'but for that person's sex.' 95 The Seventh Circuit
stated that it is "critical, in applying the comparative method, to be sure that
only the variable of the plaintiffs sex is allowed to change." 96 To discover
whether the complainant's protected characteristic played a role in the adverse
employment decision, the court must look at the situation and only change the
sex of the complainant. 9 "In the comparison, the trait is the control, sex is the
independent variable, and employee treatment is the dependent variable." 98 If
in that situation, the adverse employment decision would not have occurred,
then the action qualifies as sex discrimination and the employer is
disadvantaging the employee "because of sex." 99
The associational theory was first introduced in the Loving v.
Commonwealth of Virginiadecision in 1967, in which the Supreme Court held
that "restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violated the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."'o The
associational theory established that "a person who is discriminated against
because of the protected characteristic of one with whom she associates is
actually being disadvantaged because of her own traits." 01
The Zarda court applied the associational theory to sexual orientation as
a protected class and explained that:
[I]n most contexts where an employer discriminates based on sexual
orientation, the employer's decision is predicated on opposition to
romantic association between particular sexes. For example, when an
employer fires a gay man based on the belief that men should not be

93.
94.
95.
(1978)).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116.
Id.
Id. (citing City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
Id.
Zarda, 883 F.3d at 117.
Hively, 853 F.3d at 339.
Id. at 347 (citing Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
Id.
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attracted to other men, the employer discriminates based on the
employee's own sex. 102

Both circuits noted that the "prohibition on association discrimination applies
with equal force to all the classes protected by Title VII, including sex,"1 03
because "[t]he text of the statute draws no distinction, for this purpose, among
the different varieties of discrimination it addresses."1 04
Finally, both circuits also based their conclusion on a definitional
analysis. When discussing the "nature of sexual orientation discrimination,"
the Zarda court took into account the definitions of sexual orientation,
heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality. 0 5 For example, the Second
Circuit cited to Black's Law Dictionary and stated that "homosexuality" is
defined as "characterized by sexual desire for a person of the same sex." 106
The court explained that to even "identify the sexual orientation of a particular
person, we need to know the sex of the person and that of the people to whom
he or she is attracted." 0 7 The concurring opinion in Hively expressed a similar
sentiment, stating that "[o]ne cannot consider a person's homosexuality
without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render 'same'
[sex] ... meaningless." 0 s The Zarda court specifically stated that "[b]ecause
one cannot fully define a person's sexual orientation without identifying his
or her sex, sexual orientation is a function of sex."1 09 The Zarda court went
on to say that "sexual orientation is doubly delineated by sex because it is a
function of both a person's sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is
attracted.""1 0 Therefore, the Zarda court concluded that sexual orientation is
protected, it is a function of sex and sex is a protected class under Title VII."I
B. Declining to Recognize Sexual Orientation Under Title VII: Analysis
and Methodology of the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit-in two recent high-profile decisions has held
that there can be no claim for sexual orientation discrimination under Section

102. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 124 (citing Baldwin v. Foxx, Sec'y of Dep't of Transp., EEOC
Doc. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (2015)).
103. Id. at 125.
104. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
105. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 113.
106. Id. (citing Sexual Orientation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
107. Id. (citing Hively, 853 F.3d at 358).
108. 853 F.3d at 358.
109. 883 F.3d at 113.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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703 of Title VII.11 2 This section of the Note will discuss the Eleventh Circuit
cases that concluded discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
actionable under Title VII.
In Evans v. GeorgiaRegional Hospital,113 the Eleventh Circuit held that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title VII.114
However, the court did recognize plaintiffs claim alleging discrimination
based on gender non-conformity in violation of Title VII."

5

The court granted

Evans leave to amend her complaint to provide more details to suggest that
the alleged adverse employment actions were due to the fact that she presented
herself in a masculine manner.116
In Evans's complaint, she alleged the following facts, which the Eleventh
Circuit accepted as true." 7 From August 2012 to October 2013, Evans worked
as a security officer at Georgia Regional Hospital." During her time of
employment, Evans was "denied equal pay or work, harassed, and physically
assaulted or battered."11 9 She was discriminated against at the hospital
because of her sex and was terminated for failing to carry herself in a
"traditional woman[ly] manner."1 20 Although Evans is a lesbian, she was not

112. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 723 F. App'x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), reh'g en bane
denied, 894 F.3d 1335 (1 th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,2019 WL 1756677 (Apr. 22, 2019); Evans
v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). For examples of similar holdings, see
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that "sexual orientation
is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title VII"); Medina v. Income Support
Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that "Title VII's protections . . do
not extend to harassment due to a person's sexuality"); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000))
(stating that "Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.... Congress
has repeatedly rejected legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual
orientation"); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding that "as drafted and authoritatively construed, Title VII does not proscribe harassment
simply because of sexual orientation"); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69,
70 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979),
abrogatedby Nicholas v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)) (affirming lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant and stating that "Title VII does prohibit
discrimination against homosexuals."); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir.
1979) (holding that "[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII"); DeSantis,
608 F.2d at 329-30 (concluding that "Title VII's prohibition of 'sex' discrimination . . should
not be judicially extended to sexual preference such as homosexuality").
113. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
114. Id. at 1255.
115. Id. at 1254.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1251.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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open about that fact, nor did she "broadcast her sexuality" in the workplace.
"However, it was 'evident' that she identified with the male gender because
of how she presented herself-'(male uniform, low male haircut, shoes,
etc.')."'121 The court recognized that a discrimination claim based on gender
non-conformity was actionable.1 22 As in the Price Waterhouse case, this court
stated that "[d]iscrimination based on failure to conform to a gender
stereotype is sex-based discrimination."1 23
More specifically, the court stated that in Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh
Circuit "held that discrimination against a transgender individual because of
gender non-conformity was sex discrimination."1 24 Further, "a gender nonconformity claim is not 'just another way claim discrimination based on
sexual orientation,' but instead, constitutes a separate, distinct avenue for
relief under Title VII."1

25

However, the court concluded that "Evans did not

provide enough factual matter to plausibly suggest that her decision to present
herself in a masculine manner led to the alleged adverse employment
actions."1 26 On the gender non-conformity claim, the court granted Evans
leave to amend her complaint as she was a pro se litigant and had not
previously amended her complaint.1 27
In declining to recognize a claim of sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII, the court relied on binding precedent of the Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp case of 1979.128 Blum expressly held that "[d]ischarge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII."1

29

Further, the Evans court

explicitly stated that despite the fact that claims for gender non-conformity
and same sex discrimination may be brought under Title VII, that does not
allow the court to abandon the longstanding precedent in Blum.1 30
The concurring opinion by Judge Pryor delves into further discussion on
not recognizing sexual orientation under Title VII. Judge Pryor opined that a
person who experiences discrimination because of sexual orientation and a

121. Id.
122. Id. at 1254.
123. Id. (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011)).
124. Id. at 1254 (citing Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1317).
125. Id. at 1254-55 (citing Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1318-19).
126. Id. at 1254.
127. Id. at 1255.
128. Id (citing Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)). In Bonner v.
City ofPrichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted
as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of
business on September 30, 1981.
129. Id (citing Blum, 597 F.2d at 938).
130. Id at 1256 (citing Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 707 (1lth Cir. 2010); N.L.R.B. v.
Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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person who experiences discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes
are two "legally distinct" concepts.' 3 ' Judge Pryor stated that "[t]he
unsurprising reality that some individuals who have experienced
discrimination because of sexual orientation will also have experienced
discrimination because of gender nonconformity by no means establishes that
every gay individual who experiences discrimination because of 3sexual
2
orientation has a 'triable case of gender stereotyping discrimination."1
In other words, sexual orientation discrimination does not always
constitute gender stereotype discrimination. This led to Judge Pryor's
argument that the court does not afford relief based on status alone but must
rest on the behavior. 33 This is the same argument that the Second Circuit used
in the Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble case prior to overturning its decision in
2018.134 Price Waterhouse and Glenn also concerned claims that an
employee's behavior, not status alone, deviated from a gender stereotype held
by an employer. 13
Following the court's decision in Evans, the same issue reached the
Eleventh Circuit one year later. In Bostock v. Clayton County, 3 6 the plaintiff,
a gay male, alleged a claim of sexual orientation discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.137 Bostock began working for Clayton
County as the Child Welfare Services Coordinator in mid-January, 2003,
where he was primarily responsible for the Clayton County Court Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA). 138 "During [Bostock's] ten-year career with
Clayton County, [he] received good performance evaluations and the program
he managed received accolades."1 39
In January of 2013, Bostock joined a gay recreational softball league and
actively promoted CASA to his "league members as a good volunteer
opportunity."1 40 In the following months, Bostock "allege[d] that his
participation in the league and his sexual orientation and identity were openly
criticized by one or more persons with significant influence on Clayton

131. Id. at 1258.
132. Id. (citing Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009)).
133. Id. at 1259.
134. See 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005).
135. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1259. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
136. Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 1:16-CV-1460-ODE, 2017 WL 4456898 (N.D. Ga.
July 21, 2017), aff'd, 723 F. App'x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), reh'g en bane denied, 893 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL 1756677 (Apr. 22, 2019).
137. Id. at *1-2.
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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County's decision-making."' 4' In April 2013, "Clayton County advised
[Bostock] that it would be conducting an internal audit on the CASA program
funds that he managed."' 4 2 Bostock argued that he did not-in any way shape
or form partake in any inappropriate conduct while he controlled the funds
and that the audit was a clear "pretext for discrimination." 4 3 In early June of
2013, Bostock was terminated, "allegedly for conduct unbecoming one of its
employees."' 4 4 Bostock alleged "that this reason was pretext for
discrimination based on his sexual orientation." 14 5
Bostock appealed the district court's dismissal of his employment
discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against
Clayton County, Georgia, for failure to state a claim.1 46 The Eleventh Circuit's
decision followed the precedent set by Blum and Evans.1 47 The court stated

that through Evans, Blum remains binding in the Eleventh Circuit.1 48 In its per
curiam opinion, the court stated, "In Evans, we specifically rejected the
argument that Supreme Court precedent in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 250-51 (1989), supported a cause of action for sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII." 149 The court concluded that "the district court
did not err in dismissing Bostock's complaint for sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII because [the] holding in Evans foreclose[d]
Bostock's claim."15 0

The Eleventh Circuit also ordered that Bostock's case would not be
reheard en banc.1 5 ' Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum dissented from the denial of
rehearing, arguing that the case was "en-banc-worthy" for a few reasons.1 52
First, she stated that, recently, the Second and Seventh Circuits found the issue
of "such extraordinary importance" that they have each addressed it en
banc.1 53 Second, Judge Rosenbaum recited data to display how many people

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). "Discharge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII." Id. (emphasis added).
148. See Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
149. Bostockv. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 723 F. App'x 964, 964-65 (11th Cir. 2018).
150. Id. at 965.
151. Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 894 F.3d 1335, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
152. Id. at 1336 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
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are potentially affected by the issue.1' Third, she continued to call the
precedential value of Blum into question and referenced her dissent from the
Evans case, where she explained why Price Waterhouse abrogatedBlum."'
Judge Rosebaum went so far as to call Blum "the precedential equivalent of
an Edsel with a missing engine."156 She concluded with a call to action and
stated that the Eleventh Circuit "should not sit idly by and leave victims of
discrimination remediless by allowing Blum to continue to stand."1 7
Bostock filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States on May 25, 2018. Since then, the case has been distributed
for conference fifteen times. On April 22, 2019, just prior to this Note's
publication, the Supreme Court granted Bostock's petition.'15
IV. OPINIONS OF GOVERNMENT ENTITIES ON INCLUDING PROHIBITION OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII: EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed its en
banc brief of amicus curiae in the Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. case upon
being asked by the Second Circuit. 159 Following the EEOC's submission, the
United States Department of Justice filed a competing amicus brief.1 60

154. Id. (citing GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., How MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 1, 3, 6 (2011) ("In 2011, about 8 million Americans
identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Of those who so identify, roughly 25% report
experiencing workplace discrimination because their sexual preferences do not match their
employers' expectations." (citation omitted). Further, Judge Rosenbaum noted that the effects
of sexual orientation discrimination are not just limited to those on people, they also drag down
the economy by reducing worker productivity and increasing turnover. Id. at 1337 n.7 (citing
M.V. Lee Badgett, The Economic Case for Supporting LGBT Rights, ATLANTIC (Nov. 29,
2014),

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/1 1/the-economic-case-for-

supporting-1gbt-rights/383131.).
155. Id. at 1337-38 (citing Evans v. Georgia Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1261-73 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017)).
156. Id. at 1337.
157. Id. at 1339.
158. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 723 F. App'x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), reh'g en
banc denied, 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL 1756677 (Apr. 22, 2019).
159. Alison Frankel, 2nd Circuit Demolishes Key DOJ Argument Against Workplace
Protectionfor Gays, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legalus-otc-titlevii/2nd-circuit-demolishes-key-doj-argument-against-workplace-protection-for-gays-

idUSKCNIGA20Y.
160. Id.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

In submitting an en banc brief of amicus curiae in Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc. on June 23, 2017, the EEOC argued that Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation through its prohibition of
discrimination "because of. . . sex."' 6 ' The EEOC advanced its opinion
through three different methods or theories: the "because of sex" theory or
what the Second Circuit calls the "comparative test"; the "associational
theory"; and "sex stereotyping" theory, which was used in the Price
Waterhouse gender discrimination case.' 62 The EEOC also stated that the
precedent of Simonton and Dawson should be overruled because the cases that
Simonton relied on are largely no longer good law, and the distinction that
Simonton and Dawson draw between "valid gender nonconformity claims and
invalid sexual orientation claims is unworkable in practice and leads to absurd
results." 6 3 This last argument is no longer relevant because the Second
Circuit overruled these precedents.
Not surprisingly, the EEOC's analysis largely tracked the methodology
of the Second and Seventh Circuits, discussed above. In describing the
"because of sex" theory, the EEOC's brief sounds familiar to the "comparative
test" analysis accepted in the Second Circuit. If an employer treats an
employee less favorably than it would treat a comparable employee who, aside
from his or her sex, is identical in all respects (including the sex of that
employee's spouse), the employer discriminates against the employee
"because of sex."'64 The EEOC referred to this as Manhart's "simple test of
Title VII discrimination" because this test comes from the 1978 Supreme
Court case City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart.165 The case was a class action brought under Title VII that
challenged the city department's requirement that female employees make
larger contributions to its pension fund than male employees.1 66 The Manhart
Court found that such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the
evidence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's
67
sex would be different."1

161. En Banc Br. of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in
Supp. of Pis./Appellants and in Favor of Reversal at 5, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d
100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775) [hereinafter EEOC Brief].
162. Id. at 5-13.
163. Id. at 18.
164. Id. at 5-6.
165. Id. at 6 (citing City of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978)).
166. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 702.
167. Id. at 711.
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The EEOC noted that several courts have already applied Manhart's
simple test to hold that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes
discrimination because of sex, including the Seventh Circuit, the Western
District of Washington, the District of Oregon, and the Central District of
California.' 6 8 Within this analysis, the EEOC also made an argument very
similar to that of the Hively court, which stated that "[o]ne cannot consider a
person's homosexuality without also accounting for their sex: doing so would
render 'same'

[sex] . . . meaningless." 6 9 Each of the cases coming out of

these district or circuit courts recognizes the same principle: "sexual
orientation discrimination requires the employer to take the employee's sex
into account (in conjunction with the sex of that employee's actual or desired
partner)." 70
The EEOC argued that sexual orientation discrimination also violates
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination because it treats individuals
differently based on the sex of those with whom they associate. '7' The EEOC
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's conclusions about applying the
associational theory which was traditionally applied to race discrimination
cases-to sex discrimination cases. 172 The brief cited to cases from the Second
Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Sixth Circuit to show that the standards for proving
sex discrimination and race discrimination are the same. 173 Therefore, the
EEOC argued, the associational theory can apply equally to discrimination
based on sex, among others such as religion, color, or national origin.1 74
Lastly, the EEOC argued that sexual orientation discrimination
necessarily involves sex stereotyping, as it results in the adverse treatment of
individuals because "they do not conform to the norm that men should be
attracted only to women, and women only to men." 75 The EEOC advanced
this opinion through the "gender stereotyping" theory of Price Waterhouse.176
The brief concluded on this argument that intentional discrimination on the
basis of the gender of an individual's actual or desired partners necessarily
implicated stereotypes relating to "proper" sex-specific roles in
relationships. 177

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

EEOC Brief, supra note 161, at 6-7.
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th Cir. 2017).
EEOC Brief, supra note 161, at 7 (citing Hively, 853 F.3d at 358).
Id at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
Id at 15.
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United States DepartmentofJustice

After the EEOC submitted their amicus curiae brief in the Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc. case, the United States Department of Justice filed a
competing amicus brief. The United States' amicus curiae brief concluded that
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual orientation. 178
The United States had two arguments of its own in addition to addressing the
arguments advanced by the EEOC in its brief. The first argument stated that
in order for Title VII to be violated, men and women must be treated
unequally, and the second argument stated that discrimination because of
sexual orientation is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII. 179
The United States' first argument, that Title VII's bar against
discrimination because of sex is not violated unless men and women are
treated unequally, is supported by text from the Oncale opinion. The Oncale
opinion stated that the "critical issue, Title VII's text, indicates is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."'s This
argument seems to indicate that sexual orientation cannot be recognized under
Title VII because it can be said in some cases that it is a lesbian woman being
treated differently than a straight woman, or a gay man being treated
differently from a straight man. The treatment in these cases are not differing
between sexes, but between people of the same sex based on their sexual
orientation.
In its second argument, the United States pointed to precedent and the fact
that, until recently, the Courts of Appeals and the EEOC had agreed that
Congress did not intend to recognize sexual orientation discrimination as a
claim under Section 703 of Title VII.' 8 Further, the United States argued that
Congress has been given many opportunities to change the protections for
sexual orientation under Title VII, and each time, Congress has affirmed and
upheld the universally accepted legal conclusion that Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.18 2
The United States' brief leads the reader through an analysis using the
"interpretive principle" that "Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretative of a statute and to adopt that

178. Br. for United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775) [hereinafter US DOJ Brief].
179. Id. at 4, 6.
180. Id. at 5 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 8.
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interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change." 8 3 The briefs
analysis of the principle mirrors the Supreme Court's application of it in Texas
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, Inc.' 84 First, Congress was certainly "'aware of th[e] unanimous
precedent' of multiple Courts of Appeals holding that Title VII does not
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination."' By 1991, four Courts of
Appeals, specifically the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, had
already made this decision. 8 6 Further, "when President Bush signed the 1991
Title VII amendments, there is no indication that he disagreed with the
uniform view of the Courts of Appeals and the EEOC." 8 7
Second, "[a]gainst this background understanding," Congress
"amend[ed] [Title VII] while still adhering to the operative language."'
Congress proceeded to insert new additions to Title VII, which established the
"methods and burdens of proof for sex discrimination claims," and while these
new provisions used the term "sex," they did not include "sexual orientation
within the definition of sex nor add[] it as an independently protected trait."1 89
Third, "further 'confirmation of Congress' understanding' exists in 'the
substance of the [1991] amendments."'1 90 The 1991 amendments supported
the judicial decisions that had declined to recognize sexual orientation
discrimination as a claim under Title VII while rescinding several other Title
VII decisions that Congress believed had "sharply cut back on the scope and
effectiveness of the statute."191 The United States argued that since Congress
did not hesitate to revise other judicial interpretations of Title VII that it has
"deemed unduly narrow," "it is telling that Congress elected not to disturb the
cases holding that Title VII does not bar sexual orientation discrimination."192
Finally, the 1991 Congress also denied a proposal for legislation that would
have "expressly amended Title VII to [prohibit] discrimination based on 'sex,
affectional or sexual orientation.'"193

183.
184.
185.
135 S. Ct.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
(2004)).
193.

Id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10 (citing Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Comtys. Project, Inc.,
2507, 2519 (2015)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2520).
Id..
Id. (quotingInclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2520).
Id. (quoting Ricciv. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 624 (2009)).
Id. at 11-12 (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 594 n.7
Id. at 12 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. H1727-02) (1991)).
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Since 1991, Congress has refused to enact any type of legislation that
would forbid discrimination in employment due to one's sexual orientation
under Title VII. 194 The brief stated that "[s]uch 'congressional silence after
95
years ofjudicial interpretation supports adherence to the traditional view."'1
Furthermore, in several statutes other than Title VII, Congress has expressly
prohibited sexual orientation discrimination, but the sexual orientation
discrimination provisions are completely separate from those that prohibit sex
discrimination.196 In each of these statutes, Congress listed "sexual
orientation" discrimination independent of "sex" or "gender" discrimination,
rather than including it within "sex" discrimination. 197 This illustrates that
"Congress considers 'sexual orientation' discrimination to be distinct from,
rather than a subset of, 'sex' or 'gender' discrimination, and also that Congress
knows how to cover 'sexual orientation' discrimination separately from 'sex'
or 'gender' discrimination" when it decides to include it. 198 On this argument,
the United States concluded that this is not a situation where "statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils."' 99 "Congress was well aware of the distinct practice of
sexual orientation discrimination" . . . when adopting Title VII's ban on sex

discrimination in 1964, and especially when amending it in 1991, "and chose
not to ban it." 200

The United States concluded its brief by arguing against the theories
advanced by the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit. The United States argued that
the analysis by the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit of the "but for" test, or
"comparative test," for sex discrimination is incorrect for two reasons. First,
the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit failed to hold everything else constant
because their hypothetical changed both the employee's sex (from male to
female) and his sexual orientation (from gay to straight).201 The United States
argued that the "but-for" comparison rule "can't do its job of ruling in sex
discrimination as the actual reason for the employer's decision if we're not
scrupulous about holding everything constant except the plaintiffs sex." 202
The brief stated that "the proper comparison would be to change the
employee's sex (from male to female) but to keep the sexual orientation

194. Id
195. Id (quoting Cline, 540 U.S. at 594).
196. Id. at 13.
197. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
198. Id
199. Id at 14 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
200. Id
201. Id. at 16.
202. Id. (quoting Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 366 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes,
J., dissenting)).
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constant (as gay)."203 This hypothetical would satisfy Manhart's "simple
test," because the "employee would be adversely affected regardless of sex
(whether as a gay man or gay woman)."

204

Second, the United States argued that even if the Seventh Circuit and
EEOC were applying the "but-for" test correctly, that test is not utilized in
establishing "disparate treatment of men and women" where an employer
addresses circumstances where "the sexes are not similarly situated." 205 The
brief cited to other Courts of Appeals, such as the Fourth and Ninth Circuit,
that have rejected the use of the "but-for" test advocated by the EEOC and
Seventh Circuit majority outside the context of sexual orientation
discrimination. 206 The United States concluded that "an employer who
discriminates based on sexual orientation alone does not treat similarly
situated employees differently but for their sex," because gay men and gay
women are treated the same. 207
The United States also argued that the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit have
committed two errors in applying the sex-stereotyping theory. 208 The EEOC
and Seventh Circuit contended "that sexual orientation discrimination
necessarily involves sex stereotyping because it allegedly targets an
employee's failure to conform to the gender norm of opposite-sex
attraction." 209 First, their analysis "erroneously presumes that sexual
orientation discrimination always reflects a gender-based stereotype." 21 0 To
bring a sex-stereotyping claim like in Price Waterhouse, "an employee 'must
show that the employer actually relied on her [or his] gender in making its
decision.' 211"[W]here an employer discriminates against a female employee

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. (first quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989); then
quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)).
206. Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit stated that, "'companies may differentiate between
men and women in appearance and grooming policies' so long as the policy 'does not
unreasonably burden one gender more than the other."' Id. (quoting Jespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Therefore, the "but-for" test
could not be used in this situation because the sexes are not similarly situated. Id. at 17. The
Fourth Circuit held that an employer may use "physical fitness standards that distinguish
between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of
compliance on both men and women," because "[a] singular focus on the 'but for' element skirts
the fimdamental issue of whether those normalized requirements treat men in a different manner
than women." Id. (citing Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340, 351 (4th Cir. 2016)).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 18.
209. Id. (first citing EEOC Brief, supra note 161, at 13; then citing Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 2017)).
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).
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solely because she is gay" (without regard to other characteristics that are not
the norm for her sex), "it is not necessarily true that the employer has 'actually
relied on her gender in making its decision." 2 12 Second, the United States
argued that even if sexual orientation discrimination can be considered
gender-based stereotype, such discrimination is not the type of stereotype
prohibited by Price Waterhouse.213 Title VII prohibits "sex stereotypes" as
long as that certain type of "sex-based consideration[]" causes "disparate
treatment of men and women." 214 "[T]he opposite-sex attraction 'stereotype'
relied on by the EEOC and the Seventh Circuit majority does not result in
disparate treatment of the sexes because men are treated no better or worse
than similarly situated women." 215 The United States concluded that "an
employer who discriminates based on sexual orientation alone does not apply
the sort of sex stereotype proscribed by Price Waterhouse," because sexual
orientation discrimination "applies to both sexes alike." 216
The United States argued that "Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee in an interracial relationship, not because
that constitutes 'associational discrimination' as the Seventh Circuit and
EEOC argue, "but rather because that constitutes discrimination against the
'individual employee because of such individual's race."' 217 Specifically, "the
employer is treating an employee of one race differently from similarly
situated employees of the partner's race, solely because the employer deems
the employee's own race to be either inferior or superior to the partner's
race." 218 In comparison, an employer who discriminates against an employee
in a same-sex relationship is involved in "sex-neutral treatment of homosexual
men and women alike," instead of "sex-based treatment of women as inferior
to similarly situated men, or vice versa." 219

The United States overall concluded that "the essential element of sex
discrimination under Title VII is that employees of one sex must be treated
worse than similarly situated employees of the other sex," and this element is
missing from sexual orientation discrimination. 220 Further, this remains "a
question for Congress to decide."

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id

22

1

at 19 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
(quotingPrice Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
at 21.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)).
at 22.
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The CurrentStatus of the Zarda Case

On May 29, 2018, Altitude Express, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.222 This petition was
filed after a rehearing of the case, en banc, where the Second Circuit found
for the plaintiff and held that "sexual orientation discrimination is motivated,
at least in part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination" for purposes
of Title VII. 223 Since the petition was filed, the case has been distributed for
conference fourteen times. On April 22, 2019, just prior to this Note's
publication, the Supreme Court finally granted Altitude Express, Inc.'s
petition for writ of certiorari. 224 This case is consolidated with Bostock v.
Clayton County.
V.

ANALYSIS

A.

Evolution of the Fourth Circuit Ideology: From Conservative to
Liberal and How It Affects Outcomes in Employment Law

The political ideology of a court has an impact on the way the judges will
rule on a given issue. This section will discuss the ideological history and
current status of the Fourth Circuit to better predict how the judges would rule
if presented with the issue of whether sexual orientation discrimination is a
recognized claim under Title VII. Prior to 2010, the Fourth Circuit was one of
the most conservative Courts of Appeals in the country. 225 However, the
pipeline of President Obama's successful nominees to the bench beginning in
2010 has shifted the court toward liberal ideologies. 226
When George W. Bush was sworn in on January 20, 2001, there were
four empty seats on the Fourth Circuit.227 By the end of President Bush's first
term, the Fourth Circuit was known for its "conservative philosophy of law"
and "conservative political agenda." 228 However, by the time that President

222. Pet. for Writ of Cert., Altitude Express, Inc., v. Zarda, No. 17-1623 (May 29, 2018).
223. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019
WL 1756678 (Apr. 22, 2019).
224. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL
1756678 (Apr. 22, 2019).
225. Brian S. Clarke, The Clash of Old and New Fourth CircuitIdeologies: Boyer-Liberto
v. Fountainebleau Corp. and the Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 S.C. L. REv. 927, 927
(2015).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 930.
228. Id. at 932 (quoting Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Mar. 9, 2003, at 42).
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Bush's presidency was coming to an end, it had the same political makeup as
when he was elected president, with "six judges nominated by Republican
presidents, five judges nominated by Democratic presidents, and four
vacancies."

229

When Barack Obama assumed the office of the presidency on January 20,
2009, there were four vacancies to be filled on the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 23 0 However, in July 2009, Judge Karen Williams suddenly retired
due to illness and created a fifth vacancy on the bench. 231' By the end of
Obama's first term in office, he had remade the Fourth Circuit into a heavily
Democratic court with six confirmed nominees. 23 2 This left the bench with
"ten judges nominated by Democratic presidents and five nominated by
Republican presidents."233

A study done in 2015 compared outcomes from 2004, 2006, and 2008
with 2010 and 2012 for all of the Fourth Circuit's labor and employment
decisions. 234 Overall the results of the study showed a shift in the ideology of
the Fourth Circuit toward the liberal end of the spectrum as President Obama's
nominees took their seats on the bench. 235 This shift resulted in a decrease in
employer victories in cases appealed by employees to the Fourth Circuit.236
The current composition of the court has not changed much since
President Obama's time in office in terms of political ideology, with seven
judges nominated by Republican presidents and eight judges nominated by
Democratic presidents. 237 With the decrease in employer victories in cases
appealed by employees to the Fourth Circuit, if a case on sexual orientation
protection under Title VII were to reach the court in this way, it is possible
that the Fourth Circuit would rule with the employee and recognize a claim
for sexual orientation discrimination.
Further, by only looking at the ideology of the bench, if the court were to
hear the case en banc, it is possible that the court would lean toward the more
liberal side. However, by looking at the political ideologies of the judges on
the Seventh, Second, and Eleventh Circuits, those ideologies do not appear to
strongly indicate that a court with a majority of judges appointed by

229. Id.
230. Id. at 933.
231. Id. (citing Brian S. Clarke, ObamaCourts?:The Impact of JudicialNominations on
CourtIdeology, 30 J.L. & POL'Y 191, 202 n.29 (2014)).
232. Id. at 934.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 935.
235. Id. at 935-36.
236. Id. at 936.
237. United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballot
pedia.org/United StatesCourt ofAppealsfor theFourthCircuit (last visited May 9, 2019).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss4/13

28

King: To Protect or Not to Protect, An Empirical Approach to Predicting
1179

To PROTECT OR NOT TO PROTECT

2019]

Republican presidents-or a court with a majority of judges appointed by
Democratic presidents would be more or less likely to recognize sexual
orientation discrimination as a claim under Title VII. Both the Seventh and
Second Circuit heard the Hively and Zarda cases, respectively, en banc and
both courts recognized that the employee had a claim for sexual orientation
discrimination under Title VII.

238

The Seventh Circuit has a Republican

23 9

majority
and Hively was decided in a 8-3 decision. 240 However, Chief
Judge Diane Wood, who was appointed by a Democratic president, wrote the
majority opinion. 241' Further, all of the dissenting opinions from Hively are
from judges appointed by a Republican president.242 The Second Circuit has
a Democratic majority and Zarda was decided in a 10-3 decision.243 Two out
of three of the dissenting opinions were authored by judges appointed by a
Republican president, but the majority opinion was written by Chief Judge
Robert Katzmann, who was appointed by a Democratic president. 244 Lastly,
the Eleventh Circuit heard the Evans case in a panel of three judges where the
court held that sexual orientation discrimination is not a recognizable claim
under Title VII.

245

Judge Martinez is a United States District Judge of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida and sat by
designation in the Evans case and wrote the majority opinion. 246 Judge
Martinez was nominated by a Republican president. 247 Another judge
nominated by a Republican president concurred in the opinion, while a
Democratic president appointed judge dissented. 248

238. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL
1756678 (Apr. 22, 2019); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
239. Matthew

Weber

et

al.,

Courting

Change,

REUTERS

GRAPHICS,

graphics.reuters.com/TRUMP-EFFECT-COURTS/ 010080E30TG/index.html
Mar. 28, 2019).
240. Hively, 853 F.3d at 339.

(last

https://

updated

241. Id.; See United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/UnitedStatesCourt of Appealsforthe_7thCircuit (last visited May

9,2019).
242. See generally UnitedStates Court ofAppeals for the 7th Circuit, supra note 241.

243. Weber et al., supra note 239; Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 100 (2d
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 2019 WL 1756678 (Apr. 22, 2019).
244. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100; United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/UnitedStatesCourt of Appealsforthe_2ndCircuit

(last visited May 9, 2019).
245. Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1248, 1250 (11th Cir. 2017).
246. Id. at 1250.
247. Jose Martinez, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Jose

Martinez (last visited Feb.

21, 2019).
248. Weber et al., supra note 239; Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258, 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring)
(Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Overall, there are more Republican appointed judges dissenting in
decisions to recognize a claim for sexual orientation discrimination than
Democratic appointed judges. The voting patterns and ideology of the
Seventh, Second, and Eleventh Circuit appear to indicate that, individually,
judges appointed by a Democratic president would be more likely and
judges appointed by a Republican president would be less likely to
recognize a sexual orientation discrimination claim under Title VII. 249 In
terms of overall general political ideology, it is possible that the current Fourth
Circuit would hold that sexual orientation discrimination is a valid claim
under Title VII.
B.

Using the Past to Predictthe Future:A Survey of Ten Years ofFourth
CircuitTitle VII Cases

Presidents tend to appoint judges they believe share their ideological
preferences. Whether a judge is perceived to be conservative or liberal does
not always predict how he or she will rule from the bench, and it is not a
guarantee, but the number of Democratic or Republican appointees is
generally an indicator of a circuit's conservative-liberal balance. This section
will analyze data collected from a survey of 655 Title VII cases that the Fourth
Circuit heard from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2018. The data will
be used to predict how the Fourth Circuit would rule on a sexual orientation
discrimination claim under Title VII based on how the court ruled on Title VII
cases over the past ten years.
A study by Brian S. Clarke concluded "that the overall judicial ideology
of the Fourth Circuit has indeed shifted towards the 'liberal' end of the
ideological spectrum as President Obama's nominees have taken their seat on
the court beginning in 2010," at least in the labor and employment law
realm. 250 However, specifically in Title VII employment discrimination cases,
a survey of 208 cases displays that the ideology pendulum has not swayed too
far from the conservative side.
This Author initiated a search on WestLaw to generate any Fourth Circuit
case, published or unpublished, where an active Fourth Circuit judge was on
the panel or sitting en banc, and the issues involved employment
discrimination under Title VII. 251 The WestLaw search generated 655 results.
Any cases that did not involve substantive Title VII claims and cases where

249. See infra Appendix I for data table.
250. Clarke, supra note 231, at 221.
251. This search was performed on January 18-19, 2019 with the following search terms:
adv: ju, PA, HG, SY (Agee Diaz Duncan Floyd Gregory Harris Keenan King Motz Niemeyer
Thacker Wilkinson Wynn Quattlebaum Richardson) & DA(aft 01/2008) & "title vii."
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the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the reasoning of the district court without any
discussion of the substantive law were both removed. Data was collected from
the 208 cases remaining. If there was a reversal ofjudgment for the employer,
fully or on a majority of claims, or the court affirmed the judgment for the
employee, fully or on a majority of claims, the case was categorized as "for
employee/liberal." 252 However, if there was a reversal of judgment for the
employee, fully or on a majority of claims, or the court affirmed the judgment
for the employer, fully or on a majority of claims, the case was categorized as
"for employer/conservative. "253
Data was also collected for each judge on the panel for the case. If the
judge joined or wrote the majority opinion, their vote for that case would be
the same category as the case overall; however, if the judge dissented on a
majority of claims, it would be the opposite. For example, if a judge joined
the opinion on a "for employer/conservative" case, his vote would also be
categorized as "for employer/conservative." However, if the judge dissented
on a majority of Title VII issues in that case, his vote would be considered
"for employee/liberal." Lastly, the "(D)" or "(R)" beside each judge's name
indicates whether they were appointed by a Democratic or Republican
president, respectively.
Table 1: Ten Years of Title VII Fourth Circuit Rulings Categorized by
Outcome and Ideology
For Employer/Conservative
For Employee/Liberal
158

50

Table 2: Ten Years of Title VII Currently Active Fourth Circuit Judge Votes
Categorized by Outcome and Ideology 254

Judge
Agee (R)

For
Employer/Conservative
30

For
Employee/Liberal
10

252. "Employment law cases are separately tracked and correlated with ideology (either
'liberal' or 'conservative') in both the Supreme Court database and the U.S. Courts of Appeals
database." Clarke, supra note 231, at 203. Where "an outcome is in favor of an employee, or an
agency acting on behalf of an employee, it is 'liberal,' while an outcome in favor of the employer
is 'conservative."' Id.
253. Id.
254. As previously noted, this search was performed on January 18-19, 2019 and intended
to only include active judges to rule out some uncertainty involved with senior judges' cases.
Senior Judge Duncan is included in this table as she assumed senior status on March 21, 2019,
approximately two months after the research was performed.
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Diaz (D)

21

11

Duncan (R)
Floyd (D)

34
22

10
7

Gregory (D)

24

18

Harris (D)
Keenan (D)

12
22

7
12

King (D)

39

9

Motz (D)
Niemeyer (R)

34
36

9
6

Thacker (D)
Wilkinson (R)

14
45

4
7

Wynn (D)

27

10

Quattlebaum (R)
Richardson (R)

1
0

0
0

The data in Table 1 and Table 2 above lead to the conclusion that over the
past ten years, regardless of the influx of judges nominated by President
Obama, the Fourth Circuit is still a heavily conservative court when it comes
to Title VII employment law cases. Even judges appointed by Democratic
more than "for
employer/conservative"
voted
"for
presidents
employee/liberal." According to these results, if a sexual orientation
discrimination claim under Title VII was presented to the Fourth Circuit en
banc, the court would likely hold that sexual orientation discrimination is not
protected under Title VII.
C.

Opinions of the Fourth Circuit in Employment Discriminationand
Sexual OrientationDiscrimination

This section will discuss opinions that may serve as precedent for the
Fourth Circuit. Two 1996 Fourth Circuit decisions explicitly state that Title
VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination; however, the cases are
not actually about sexual orientation discrimination. 255 Both of the cases

255. See generally Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title
VII does not provide a cause of action for an employee who has been subjected to sexual
harassment by a supervisor of the same gender."); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138,
143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Title VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon
sexual orientation.").
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involve whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII
because they both predate the Supreme Court decision in Oncale, which stated
that same-sex sexual harassment can be actionable under Title VII. 25 6 Lastly,

the section discusses a more recent case that cites to one of the Fourth Circuit
cases from 1996, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut ofAmerica,257 and a 2016 case on
Title VII coverage, Finkle v. Howard County.258
The first case in the Fourth Circuit to explicitly state that Title VII does
not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination was Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co. 25 9 The Hopkins opinion was decided by three judges who are
still serving on the Fourth Circuit bench: Judge Niemeyer, Judge Wilkinson,
and Senior Judge Hamilton.260 The case concerned a former male employee
who brought an action against his former employer under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, alleging that his supervisor's conduct created a sexually
hostile work environment.261
To decide the issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment was
prohibited under Title VII, Judge Niemeyer began with the applicable
statutory language. 262 "Title VII prohibits 'an employer' from 'discriminating
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex."' 263 The
court noted that "[v]iewed in the abstract, a prohibition of "discrimination
based on 'sex' is broad and perhaps even undefinable." 264 In the abstract, the
court stated, the word might also even be read to prohibit discrimination based
on "human psychological and physiological characteristics or on sexual
orientation." 265 However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that, given Title VII's
history, it was clear that Congress did not intend "such sweeping regulation"
and that "detached from their historical setting," the terms of Title VII stand
only as "inert language, lifeless words," and even "playthings with which to
reconstruct the Act." 266

To further support that Title VII should not be read to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation or all workplace sexual behavior,

256. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 75 (1998).
257. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
258. 640 F. App'x 245 (4th Cir. 2016).
259. See 77 F.3d at 751.
260. Id. at 746.
261. Id. at 747.
262. Id. at 749. The analysis addressed in this section about Hopkins appears in Section II
of the opinion, where Judge Niemeyer is writing for himself, not the court.
263. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2008)).
264. Id. at 749.
265. Id.
266. Id. (quoting Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)).
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the Fourth Circuit examined Title VII's legislative history. "Just two days
before the House of Representatives passed Title VII, it adopted an
amendment adding 'sex' as a prohibited basis for discrimination" because it
would "do some good for the minority sex" by warranting that women would
receive "as high compensation for their work as do the majority sex."26 7 Since
the Act's passage, it has been interpreted in a number of ways to expand its
coverage; however, at this point, the Supreme Court had not "specifically
addressed the question of whether the Act's prohibitions apply when the
268
harasser and the victim are the same sex."

The Fourth Circuit held that "same-gender harassment may be actionable
under Title VII in appropriate circumstances." 269 The court stated that "it is
apparent from the historical record that Congress, in prohibiting sex
discrimination, meant to prohibit discrimination only on the basis of the
employee's status as a man or woman, it is also clear from the statutory
language itself, that only the sex of the employee is relevant in determining
whether Title VII is implicated."

270

This decision clearly limits the interpretation of Title VII. The court
stated, "It follows that in prohibiting sex discrimination solely on the basis of
whether the employee is a man or a woman, Title VII does not reach
discrimination based on other reasons," such as conduct based on the
employee's sexual orientation. 271 Judge Niemeyer explicitly stated that,
"Such conduct is aimed at the employee's sexual orientation and not at the
fact that the employee is a man or woman." 272 It is clear, that at this time, the
Fourth Circuit would not have agreed with the Seventh and Second Circuitin fact, it would have held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
because of sexual orientation.
The next Fourth Circuit case, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,
arose from a very similar set of facts as the Hopkins case. A male employee
brought an action against his employer, alleging that his homosexual male
supervisor and other homosexual male employees subjected him, as a
heterosexual male, to "hostile work environment" sexual harassment that is
prohibited under Title VII.

273

The Fourth Circuit, again, held that a claim

267. Id. at 749 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964)).
268. Id. at 750; see The Evolution and Expansion of Coverage of Section 703 of Title VII
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra Part II.
269. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 751.
270. Id
271. Id
272. Id. at 752.
273. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
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under Title VII for same-sex "hostile work environment" harassment may be
actionable where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment is homosexual.274
In Wrightson, the defendant contended that, even if there was a claim for
same-sex harassment, Wrightson's claim did not actually complain that he
was harassed because of his sex, but rather, because of his sexual orientation
as a heterosexual. 275 The court stated that Wrightson did not allege that he was
discriminated against because of his sexual orientation, because his complaint
specifically alleged that he was discriminated against "because of his sex,
male." 276 However, the court did agree with the defendant that "Title VII does
not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual
orientation." 277
In a 2015 case, Murray v. N.C. Dep't. of Public Safety, 278 the plaintiff

"allege[d] that he overheard a supervisor and co-worker gossiping about
another co-worker's sexual orientation, that he complained about this gossip,"
and that following his complaints, the "supervisor and co-worker retaliated
against him by creating a hostile and unsafe work environment." 279 The
district court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title VII
because a one-time comment about a co-worker's sexual orientation is
inadequate to establish an actual hostile workplace, and the situation did not
fall under Title VII retaliation protection. 28 0 The plaintiff appealed the district
court's order dismissing his case for a failure to state a claim in his complaint
alleging retaliation under Title VII. 281' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's order after finding no reversible error. 28 2 In its decision, the Fourth
Circuit cited to Wrightson v. Pizza Hut ofAmerica., Inc. and included in the
citation's parenthetical "recognizing that Title VII does not protect against
sexual orientation discrimination."

283

In the most recent case regarding Title VII coverage, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals "declined to address the coverage issue in a Title VII claim
brought by a transgender employee." 28 4 The case was decided in March of

274. Id. at 143.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Murray v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 1:14-CV-985, 2015 WL 11089742
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2015), aff'd, 611 F. App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2015).
279. Id. at *2.
280. Id.
281. Murray v. N.C. Dep't of Pub Safety, 611 F. App'x 166 (4th Cir. 2015).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Jonathan M. Crotty & Michel Vanesse, Fourth Circuit Ducks Transgender
DiscriminationCoverage Under Title VII, PARKER POE ADAMS & BERNSTEIN (Mar. 23, 2016),
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2016 in an unpublished opinion. In Finkle v. Howard County, the plaintiff
sued under Title VII alleging that she was not hired for a police job because
she is a transgender female.2 8 5 The plaintiff alleged that the "failure to hire
constituted sex discrimination under Title VII" but did not assert the sex
stereotyping theory used in cases such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 28 6 The
court did not even address whether her claim was included under Title VII,
but rather "rejected her contentions based on the weight of the evidence
presented." 28 7 The court stated that the evidence of bias was only a single
remark made in a memorandum, which was issued months before the hiring
decision. 288 Further, "the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the business
reasons provided by the employer for failure to hire were pretext of
discrimination. "289 "The Fourth Circuit also noted that the defendant never
challenged the plaintiffs ability to sue for sex discrimination based on
transgender status, and therefore the court did not address this issue."290
Based on the statements from Hopkins and Wrightson, it is unlikely the
Fourth Circuit would recognize a claim for sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII. If the Fourth Circuit heard a case en banc, it is highly possible
that the judges will see these cases as strong persuasive evidence that Title
VII does not provide protection for sexual orientation discrimination.
However, the court now has many more arguments to consider that were
raised in current cases from the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits that
may sway them in another direction. However, the Finkel case illustrates that
the Fourth Circuit is not willing to make such a landmark decision-either
way unless the case provides adequate evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION

Overall, the Fourth Circuit is not likely to recognize a claim for sexual
orientation discrimination under Section 703 of Title VII. Even though
comparing the political ideology of the Fourth Circuit to the Second, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuit revealed that Democratic judges are more likely to
recognize such a claim, looking closely at how the active Fourth Circuit
judges have ruled over the past ten years in Title VII cases showed that every

https://www.parkerpoe.com/news/2016/03/fourth-circuit-ducks-transgender-discriminationcoverage-under-title.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
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single judge-regardless of political ideology or presidential appointment
voted for the "for employer/conservative" more times than "for
employee/liberal." Further, two cases from the Fourth Circuit explicitly state
that sexual orientation discrimination is not a recognizable claim under Title
VII, and other circuits have even cited the Wrightson case in denying
recognition of a claim for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII. 291
However, the Finkel case illustrates that the Fourth Circuit is not willing to
make such a landmark decision-either way unless the case provides
adequate evidence. If the Fourth Circuit receives a case with adequate
evidence on the subject and were to have a hearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit
would likely not recognize sexual orientation discrimination as a claim under
Section 703 of Title VII.

291. E.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citing Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) and stating that Title
VII's protections do not extend to harassment due to a person's sexuality).
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APPENDIX I

Table I: Seventh Circuit Political Ideology Split in Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College ofIndiana

Republican
Appointed Judge
Democrat
Appointed Judge

Majority

Concurring

Dissenting

3

3

3

2

0

0

Table II: Second Circuit Political Ideology Split in Zardav. Altitude Express,
Inc.

Republicans
Appointed Judge
Democrat
Appointed Judge

Majority
1

Concurring
1

Dissenting
2

5

3

1
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